Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 29, 2026
Toplines
Russian forces launched a chronic mixed drone and missile strike collection towards Ukraine, primarily concentrating on Kyiv City and Oblast, that lasted for greater than 28 hours in an effort to maximise civilian harm and disrupt day by day civilian features on August 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched over 550 S8000 Banderol loitering munitions, Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones towards Ukraine all through the day on August 28, in a single day on August 28 to 29, and all through the day on August 29.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified variety of Onyx anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea in a single day on August 28 to 29.[2] The Air Force famous that an unspecified variety of air targets struck 15 places and that particles fell at 4 places. The Air Force’s knowledge means that Ukrainian forces intercepted six Banderol loitering munitions and about 86 p.c of Russian strike drones on August 28 and 29. The Air Force ceased commonly reporting the numbers of Russian ballistic missiles launched and intercepted as of August 11.[3] CNN reported that Ukrainian air raid alerts lasted for greater than 28 hours in complete between midnight on August 27 and noon on August 29 — an abnormally extended timeframe during which Russian forces most probably sought to exhaust Ukrainian air defenses, disrupt civilian day by day features, and improve the diploma of injury inflicted later within the strike collection.[4] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that Russian drones struck Kyiv City for the third consecutive day, injuring not less than 5 individuals and damaging residential and civilian infrastructure.[5] Russian forces doubtless sought to exhaust Ukrainian forces defending Kyiv, significantly forward of the August 28 to 29 strikes.
Ukrainian officers additionally famous that Russian strikes broken civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; vitality, port, and transportation infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; and civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv Oblast.[6] Russian mixed and extended strike packages proceed inflicting substantial harm in ways in which disproportionately impression civilians regardless of a excessive Ukrainian drone interception charge.[7] Russia adopted daytime strike patterns along with its nighttime strikes in early April 2026 to trigger vital disruptions in civilian day by day life and the Ukrainian economic system.[8]
Russian forces struck an ammunition warehouse on the western outskirts of Kyiv City on August 29, triggering secondary detonations and killing not less than 37 individuals. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 29 that Russian forces struck a warehouse close to Myla, Kyiv Oblast, implying that the warehouse contained unspecified ammunition close to civilian infrastructure.[9] The strike triggered a fireplace and secondary detonations, damaging not less than 130 residential buildings and a retirement residence, killing not less than 37, together with the Dmytrivska hromada head Taras Didych, who was a part of the rescue group, and injuring not less than 42.[10] Ukrainian authorities additionally restricted motion alongside a bit of the M-06 Kyiv City-Chop freeway following the secondary detonations.
The Russian authorities prolonged the gas export ban for direct producers regardless of continued efforts to posture secure home gas provides. The Russian Cabinet of Ministers voted on August 29 to increase the export ban on diesel, marine gas, and gasoline oils for direct producers till September 30 in an effort to keep secure provides for the home gas market.[11] The earlier direct producer restrictions remained in impact till August 31, 2026. Russian officers imposed in late July 2026 a normal ban on gasoline and jet gas exports by the top of 2026.[12] The head of the Russian state vitality firm Rosneft, Igor Sechin, claimed on August 29 that Rosneft is assembly home gas calls for regardless of restrictions on its refining capability.[13] Many Russian federal topics and areas in occupied Ukraine proceed fighting gas shortages, nevertheless, as Russia’s refining capability reportedly hit a 20-year low in mid-August 2026.[14] Continued Ukrainian strikes towards Russian oil infrastructure are lowering Russia’s capability to export gas, depriving Moscow of the flexibility to completely profit from the rise in world oil costs prior to now few months as a result of conflict within the Middle East, and forcing extra individuals in Russia to really feel the impacts of the conflict in Ukraine.[15]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces launched a chronic mixed drone and missile strike collection towards Ukraine, primarily concentrating on Kyiv City and Oblast, that lasted for greater than 28 hours in an effort to maximise civilian harm and disrupt day by day civilian features on August 28 and 29.
- Russian forces struck an ammunition warehouse on the western outskirts of Kyiv City on August 29, triggering secondary detonations and killing not less than 37 individuals.
- The Russian authorities prolonged the gas export ban for direct producers regardless of continued efforts to posture secure home gas provides.
- Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior within the Dobropillya course.
- Ukrainian forces struck the warehouses of main Russian on-line retailers in Rostov Oblast on August 27 to twenty-eight.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to judge and report on the results of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity though we don’t describe them in these reviews.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck the warehouses of main Russian on-line retailers in Rostov Oblast on August 27 to twenty-eight. Russian and Ukrainian sources, which frequently report on profitable Ukrainian drone strikes, reported that Ukrainian forces struck warehouses belonging to Ozon (a Wildberries competitor), DNS (a serious Russian electronics retailer), and Chyzhyk (produce wholesaler) in Rostov Oblast.[16] Russian opposition media outlet Astra assessed that footage of a smoke plume exhibits a fireplace at a DNS warehouse in Aksay, Rostov Oblast (roughly 210 kilometers from the frontline and within the Rostov-on-Don metropolitan space), and Ozon acknowledged a fireplace at certainly one of its services in Rostov-on-Don.[17] DNS is the fourth-largest on-line retailer in Russia behind Wildberries, Ozon, and Yandex Marketplace, and the August 27 to twenty-eight strikes seem like the primary Ukrainian strikes towards a DNS facility.[18] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck warehouses in Aksay.[19]
Ukrainian strikes towards Russian port infrastructure prompted Rostov Oblast to declare a state of emergency on August 28. Slyusar declared a state of emergency on August 28 on account of disruptions to maritime delivery within the Azov-Black Sea basin and cessation of port operations in Rostov Oblast after Ukrainian drone strikes towards Russian maritime logistics infrastructure.[20] Slyusar famous that Ukrainian strikes triggered Russian storage services to overfill with agricultural produce on account of interruptions in maritime delivery. Ukrainian strikes have considerably diminished Russian grain exports from Black Sea and Azov Sea ports, which reportedly account for over 80 p.c of all Russian worldwide grain exports.[21] Ukrainian strikes will doubtless proceed to impose harsh financial penalties on Russian federal topics as Russia struggles to adequately defend towards or counter Ukrainian strikes.
Ukraine continues its suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) marketing campaign in Bryansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Buk-M3 anti-aircraft missile system close to Klintsy (about 46 kilometers from the worldwide border) on August 28.[22] Ukrainian protection producer Fire Point reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Pantsir-S1 air protection system of the Russian 210th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Bryansk Oblast on August 27, and a Russian insider supply claimed the strike occurred close to Kletnaya (about 52 kilometers from the Bryansk-Sumy Oblast worldwide border).[23]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast alongside the worldwide border
A Ukrainian official supply refuted Russian claims of advances northeast of Sumy City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 29 that Russian forces seized Khrapivshchyna (northeast of Sumy City).[24] The Ukrainian Kursk Grouping of Forces refuted the Russian MoD declare on August 29 and said that Ukrainian forces management Khrapivshchyna.[25] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces additionally posted a map on August 29 claiming that Russian forces seized Nova Sich (northeast of Sumy City), however ISW didn’t observe proof to verify this declare.[26]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 28 and 29 however didn’t advance.[27]
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian frontline navy property in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Belgorod Oblast. A commander in a Ukrainian brigade reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck an Msta-B towed howitzer and Gvozdika self-propelled artillery system in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[28] The commander added that the state of affairs in northern Kharkiv Oblast has not modified, and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to stop Russian forces from transferring ammunition and personnel nearer to the frontline. Geolocated footage revealed on August 29 exhibits Ukrainian forces putting a Russian drone management level west of Dubrovka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 6 kilometers from the worldwide border).[29]
A supply reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and Russian milbloggers claimed on August 29 that Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykyi Burluk course, however ISW has not noticed proof that Russian forces superior.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian goal: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk and Borova instructions on August 28 and 29 however didn’t advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in each instructions.[31] Russian milbloggers and a supply reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) and close to Ridkodub, Nove, and Katerynivka (all southeast of Borova).[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian goal: Capture the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian political management continues to set unrealistic and ever-changing deadlines for Russian forces to grab the whole thing of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa reported on August 29 that Russian political management ordered Russian forces to achieve the executive borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (the whole thing of Donbas) by December 31, 2026.[33] Palisa said that Russian navy management reportedly replied that this order was unrealistic and requested for a March 31, 2027 deadline as a substitute. Palisa famous that it’s unrealistic that Russian forces would meet both the December 2026 or March 2027 deadlines primarily based on the present battlefield state of affairs. Russian President Vladimir Putin has given Russian forces 15 separate deadlines since 2022 to grab the whole thing of Donbas, and Russian forces have failed to satisfy any of them.[34] ISW continues to evaluate that the Kremlin’s deadlines for its navy targets stay unrealistic and that Russian forces are extremely unlikely to grab Donbas by the top of 2026, if in any respect.[35]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Slovyansk course on August 28 and 29 however didn’t advance.[36] A supply reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Dibrova and Starodubivka (each east of Slovyansk).[37]
Russian forces are more and more counting on international recruits as they accumulate personnel and sources for intensified future offensive operations within the Lyman course. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade working within the Slovyansk course reported on August 29 that Russian forces proceed to build up personnel and gear in preparation for intensified offensive operations within the Lyman course (northeast of Slovyansk).[38] The spokesperson famous that the proportion of international recruits (primarily from Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia) on this course not too long ago elevated to about 30 p.c of Russian Armed Forces personnel. The spokesperson said that whereas Russian forces do seem like accumulating on this course, they continue to be poorly skilled. The spokesperson added that Russian forces are prioritizing putting Ukrainian logistics and river crossings over the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets Rivers, doubtless as a part of shaping efforts for the intensified offensive operations sooner or later.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical space on August 28 and 29 however didn’t advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[39]
Russian forces performed frontline strikes towards a civilian hospital and postal logistics in and close to Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka). The Kramatorsk City Council reported on August 29 that Russian forces intentionally struck a hospital in Kramatorsk, damaging its emergency division.[40] Ukrposhta (Ukrainian postal service) General Director Ihor Smilyansky reported on August 29 that Russian forces struck a Ukrposhta truck close to Kramatorsk, injuring the motive force and destroying round 500 parcels.[41] A consultant for a humanitarian mission in Donetsk Oblast said that the variety of civilians wishing to evacuate from Donetsk Oblast elevated by 20 p.c since Russian forces intensified strikes towards the area.[42]
Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior within the Dobropillya course. Ukrainian forces not too long ago superior in Dorozhnye (southeast of Dobropillya), in accordance with geolocated footage revealed on August 29.[43] Ukrainian forces additionally both maintained positions or superior west and south of Novyi Donbas, provided that Ukrainian forces are current in these areas in accordance with geolocated footage revealed on August 28 and 29, opposite to Russian claims.[44]
The Russian MoD claimed on August 29 that Russian forces seized Novoandriivka (northeast of Dobropillya).[45]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported floor exercise within the Pokrovsk course on August 29.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka instructions on August 28 and 29 however didn’t advance.[46]
Ukrainian forces continued intermediate-range strikes towards Russian navy property in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck not less than one Russian long-range drone storage, preparation, and launch web site close to occupied Donetsk City (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) in addition to a Russian drone management level close to occupied Berestky (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) on August 28 or in a single day on August 29.[47]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions, safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Hulyaipole course and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 29.[48]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on August 29 that the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has been with out exterior energy provide for 10 days and solely has sufficient gas for diesel turbines to final one other 10 days.[49]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported floor exercise within the Kherson course on August 29.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike marketing campaign towards Russian navy property in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck not less than one Russian long-range drone storage, preparation, and launch web site close to occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea on August 28 or in a single day on August 29.[50] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) knowledge exhibits warmth anomalies on the northern finish of the Hvardiiske Air Base on August 28.[51] Geolocated footage revealed on August 28 exhibits harm to a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Voinka (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian strike.[52]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the entrance line
See topline textual content for Russian drone and missile strikes towards Ukraine in a single day.
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Putin’s residence in Moscow Oblast. Lukashenko and Putin met on August 29 at Putin’s Novo-Ogaryovo residence close to Moscow City and mentioned rising commerce turnover between Russia and Belarus, Russian direct funding, and cooperation in know-how and manufacturing of electronics.[53] Putin and Lukashenko didn’t talk about the conflict in Ukraine or navy affairs, in accordance with the Kremlin.
Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the premise for these reviews. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/75160; https://t.me/kpszsu/75065; https://t.me/kpszsu/75261
[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/75160
[3] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/
[4] https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/29/europe/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war-attack-intl
[5] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1390510-tretij-den-ataki-rf-na-kiiv-uskodzenna-v-privatnomu-sektori-travmovano-dvi-ludini/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7356; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/29/tragediya-v-kyyevi-vnaslidok-padinnya-vorozhogo-bpla-zagynula-dvorichna-divchynka-pyatero-lyudej-travmovano/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7348 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7349 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7354 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7355 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7356 ; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7358
[6] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31720 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31723 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31746 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28352 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28357 ; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/28357 ; https://t.me/mykolaiv_ova/3099; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1390574-bez-svitla-ponad-300-tis-abonentiv-armia-rf-atakuvala-energeticnu-infrastrukturu-mikolaivsini/; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid02wR1swGqnbTQKBJ2ZXdgJRwJ6rBuxaQxfFoGFhgB6dxwctvTuDjApFzEsFfeqCr2Rl?rdid=q3HEhKpSofXs5JSF#; https://suspilne dot media/mykolaiv/1390504-armia-rf-zavdala-kombinovanogo-udaru-po-mikolaivsini-poskodzena-infrstruktura/; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSODE/posts/pfbid02235qEy5KcaJuLXZ7TMNcKGQxPZLxmjLkVxJBJ2aTLMkTYaYwxeoHDVFMABW83vhl?locale=uk_UA; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19294; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1390500-zaginula-ludina-troe-poraneni-na-odesini-pisla-ataki-gorili-vantazivki/ ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/19294;
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/
[9] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/209362335 508130563 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20636 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2093675130454970521 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20637 ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/information/pislya-situaciyi-u-vishnevomu-she-odin-takij-zlochin-ce-abso-106165;
[10] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/39957; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2746; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1390464-kilkist-poranenih-zrosla-do-5-ludej-u-seli-mila-stalasa-detonacia-naslidki-udaru-rf/; https://meduza dot io/information/2026/08/28/v-kievskoy-oblasti-posle-rossiyskoy-ataki-nachalas-detonatsiya-premier-ukrainy-zayavil-chto-podobnyy-udar-po-vishnevomu-tam-pogibli-devyat-chelovek-ne-stal-urokom; https://t.me/Koretskyi_official/352 ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1390454-zahliva-tragedia-u-visnevomu-ne-stala-urokom-premer-koreckij-pro-udar-rf-po-kiivsini/; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1390432-na-kiivsini-cerez-obstril-perekrili-vidrizok-avtodorogi-m-06-kiiv-cop/; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2748; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/29/pozhezha-ta-detonacziya-na-kyyivshhyni-pislya-rosijskogo-udaru-ye-zagybli-evakuyuvaly-ponad-200-lyudej/; https://t.me/kyivoda/55219 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55221 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55233 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55244 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55255; https://t.me/kyivoda/55297; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2749; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/29/kryvavyj-udar-po-kyyivshhyni-42-postrazhdalyh-zagynuv-golova-gromady/ ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55276 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55301 ; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4320; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2754; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1390654-pozeza-na-skladah-z-detonacieu-u-bucanskomu-rajoni-zaginuli-27-ludini/; https://meduza dot io/information/2026/08/29/v-rezultate-rossiyskoy-ataki-po-skladam-pod-kievom-pogibli-27-chelovek; https://meduza dot io/characteristic/2026/08/29/voyna; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/29/kilkist-zagyblyh-u-buchanskomu-rajoni-zrosla-do-37-kyyivska-oda/ ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55313 ; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2754 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/55323
[11] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1111982; http://government dot ru/information/59723/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/
[13] https://news dot ru/russia/sechi-rosneft-obespechivaet-rynok-toplivom-i-prodaet-ego-po-stabilnoj-cene; https://t.me/tass_agency/392517
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2026/
[16] https://t.me/supernova_plus/59060; https://meduza dot io/information/2026/08/29/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-sklady-ozon-i-dns-v-rostovskoy-oblasti; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/information/vpershe-atakuvaly-sklad-dns/ ; https://t.me/istories_media/13394 ;
[17] https://t.me/astrapress/123647; https://t.me/ozonmarketplace/3253
[18] https://meduza dot io/information/2026/08/29/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-sklady-ozon-i-dns-v-rostovskoy-oblasti
[19] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/6854
[20] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1111867
[21] https://www.interfax dot ru/enterprise/1107891
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42064
[23] https://t.me/firepointofficial/253 ; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/795
[24] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21592
[25] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122145732303020644&id=61580619330534&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=X6c8gD0uPYWo2wJw#
[26] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/21592
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42058; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42061; https://t.me/severnnyi/9166; https://t.me/wargonzo/36539; https://t.me/dva_majors/98185
[28] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/29/okupanty-gotuvalysya-do-nakopychennya-syl-ale-%c2percentabapekspercentc2percentbb-znyshhyv-yihnyu-artyleriyu/; https://youtu.be/qBLrfziqXRw?t=2664
[29] https://x.com/ukrRaiders/status/2093630337628729375; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/4122
[30] https://t.me/severnnyi/9166; https://t.me/wargonzo/36539; https://t.me/dva_majors/98185
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42058 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42061
[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/36539 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19607 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/98185 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19607
[33] https://suspilne.media/1390450-na-kiivsini-gorat-skladi-fedorov-stavr-radnikom-ministra-oboroni-italii-1648-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1787996066&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_25-24/
[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42058; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42061; https://t.me/wargonzo/36539; https://t.me/dva_majors/98185; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47021;
[37] https://t.me/grvZapad/19607
[38] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1390542-na-limanskomu-napramku-do-30-rosijskih-sil-stanovlat-inozemni-najmanci-66-ombr/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42058; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42061; https://t.me/motopatriot78/55619;
[40] https://www.facebook.com/kramatorsk.rada/posts/pfbid04fFwuarspjsoq61tyS3mEdazbLtN6qdbn8zezSkYN6ubHTS662LPZbJepTKsHBAZl; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/27699
[41] https://www.facebook.com/igor.smelyansky/posts/pfbid02bmxHrDKKrnzvvSNi2KbGsXhDQ5buHGZw5URxgZiWSwgwwkeCV3gCR89brEPmTG5Kl
[42] https://youtu.be/9TAM-eohLW8 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1390620-kilkist-ohocih-evakuuvatisa-z-doneccini-zrosla-na-20-cerez-posilenna-obstriliv-proliska/
[43] https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1775; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2093639453927436528
[44] https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1762; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2093454107033895182; https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1775; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2093639453927436528
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/66860
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42058; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42061
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42064
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42058; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42061; https://t.me/wargonzo/36539; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/47009; https://t.me/dva_majors/98185; https://t.me/rybar/82738
[49] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-364-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42064
[51] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@33.989,45.126,14.672z; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2093617429205196808
[52] https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2093426750977941807
[53] http://kremlin dot ru/occasions/president/information/80624; https://t.me/MID_Russia/89366; https://t.me/pul_1/22496; https://t.me/pul_1/22494; https://t.me/pul_1/22497; https://t.me/tass_agency/392597 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/5118