Toplines
Russian forces have probably begun artillery and drone preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive in opposition to Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces shelled Bilenke (roughly 14 kilometers from the frontline and instantly northeast of Kramatorsk, the northern tip of the Fortress Belt — a collection of fortified cities which have constituted the spine of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast since 2014) on February 26 and 27 — the primary time that Russian forces have hit Kramatorsk or its suburbs with tube artillery.[1] The artillery strikes in opposition to Bilenke probably mark the start of Russian artillery preparation forward of the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 Russian offensive. Russian forces will probably start the bottom assault part of this offensive within the near-term following the artillery preparation part. Russian forces have additionally been conducting a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) marketing campaign in opposition to the southern tip of the Fortress Belt. BAI is using air energy to strike targets within the frontline’s operational rear (roughly 20 to 100 kilometers from the road of contact) to influence tactical battlefield operations, and Russia has largely been waging its BAI marketing campaign with drone strikes.[2] Geolocated footage printed on February 26 reveals Russian drone strikes in opposition to a civilian bicycle owner on the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk freeway northwest of Kostyantynivka and in opposition to Ukrainian forces in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, each on the south of the Fortress Belt.[3] The H-20 freeway is the principle floor line of communication (GLOC) connecting the cities of the Fortress Belt. Russian forces have been utilizing monthslong BAI campaigns as a part of a broader marketing campaign design aimed toward degrading Ukrainian defensive capabilities and frontline positions forward of Russian floor offensives.[4] A Ukrainian servicemember working within the Slovyansk route reported on February 26 that the Russian navy command is deploying reinforcements to the Slovyansk route, one other indicator that Russia plans to prioritize offensive operations in opposition to the Fortress Belt within the near-term.[5] A Russian floor offensive to grab the Fortress Belt will probably be a multi-year operational effort that might value the Russian navy command important time, manpower, and sources.[6] Russian forces have thus far been unable or unwilling to pay attention the sources required for a decisive offensive operation, notably in opposition to the Fortress Belt.[7]
Russia is reportedly increasing recruitment efforts in greater instructional establishments to employees the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). The BBC Russian Service reported on February 27 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has expanded its recruitment efforts to a minimum of 95 instructional establishments throughout Russia and pressured college students to signal contracts with the MoD throughout face-to-face conferences at 90 of those establishments.[8] The BBC Russian Service famous that the 95 instructional establishments don’t embody establishments the place the Russian MoD is conducting “indirect recruitment,” equivalent to opening unmanned techniques facilities at Russian universities. The BBC Russian Service famous that Russian universities are publicizing profitable recruitment efforts, prone to entice extra college students to signal contracts with the MoD. Germany-based Russian opposition outlet Echo reported February 26 that the Russian MoD is recruiting college students from a minimum of 57 universities and 13 schools and technical schools in 24 federal topics, together with occupied Crimea and has expanded its recruitment marketing campaign to incorporate all college students, not simply these underperforming academically. Echo famous that the Russian MoD is promising to college students that they may solely serve in USF models (a preferable navy occupation that faces decrease danger to life and limb than infantry) however that a minimum of among the contracts comprise language that might enable the MoD to ship the recruits to any Russian navy unit, not only a USF unit.[9] Echo reported that the Russian MoD is using a ”carrot and stick” tactic by providing advantages together with giant salaries, a assured single 12 months of service, training grants, and scholar debt forgiveness, and likewise by coercing and threatening college students into signing contracts. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 26 that the Nikolai Lunin Novosibirsk College of Transport Technologies organized a three-day screening of propaganda movies about Russians who allegedly “betrayed” Russia as a result of the scholars had refused to volunteer for navy service.[10] The Russian MoD started recruitment efforts focusing on underperforming Russian college students in December 2025 and started increasing this effort in January 2026.[11] The Russian MoD could employees the traditional Russian navy with scholar recruits. Russian forces are more and more struggling to hit recruitment targets, with Russia’s casualty price outpacing the recruitment price in January 2026, for the primary time because the begin of the full-scale invasion.[12]
The Kremlin is continuous to crack down on pro-war data house figures that it can not totally co-opt or subordinate to state management as a part of wider efforts to consolidate the data house underneath the Kremlin’s management. Russian legislation enforcement businesses introduced on February 27 that Russian authorities detained Russian information outlet Readovka founder and former editor-in-chief Alexey Kostylev underneath suspicion of “large-scale fraud.”[13] A spokesperson for the investigation advised TASS that Russian authorities suspect Kostylev of embezzling roughly one billion rubles (about $13 million) from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) throughout execution of presidency contracts.[14] Russian opposition media retailers reported that Readovka beforehand was a far-right media outlet that didn’t have shut ties to the Russian authorities till the outbreak of the battle in 2022, at which level the outlet started supporting the battle.[15] Russian opposition media outlet Astra amplified experiences that Russian forces reduce funding for Readovka in March of 2025 and that Andrey Tkachenko, who reportedly has ties with the Kremlin, took over the outlet in March 2025.[16] ISW has beforehand noticed that the Kremlin has a long-running marketing campaign to each co-opt and coerce Russian milbloggers to be able to remove criticism of the Kremlin and consolidate management over the Russian data house.[17] ISW has not collected proof that the Kremlin succeeded in co-opting Kostylev, because it did with different outstanding milbloggers or Telegram directors.[18] Russian authorities’ detainment of Kostylev is ready in opposition to the background of different Kremlin crackdowns in opposition to the data house such because the throttling of Telegram.[19] ISW has beforehand assessed that the Kremlin is contemplating enacting domestically unpopular measures equivalent to rolling involuntary reserve callups, and the Kremlin is probably going setting circumstances to repress backlash, particularly from the extremely influential pro-war sphere.[20]
A Russian drone approached the French plane provider Charles de Gaulle within the Swedish port of Malmo on February 25. The Swedish Armed Forces reported on February 27 that the Russian alerts intelligence (SIGINT) ship Zhigulevsk launched a drone illegally whereas in Swedish territorial waters within the Oresund Strait in the course of the go to of the Charles de Gaulle to Malmo.[21] The Swedish Armed Forces added {that a} close by Swedish patrol vessel noticed the drone launch and carried out countermeasures to disrupt the drone, after which the Swedish vessel misplaced contact with the drone.[22] Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson advised Swedish outlet SVT on February 26 that the Russian drone approached the Charles de Gaulle whereas it was docked in Malmo, Sweden on February 25, probably violating Swedish airspace.[23] French General Staff Spokesperson Colonel Guillaume Vernet advised Agence France-Presse (AFP) on February 26 {that a} Swedish system jammed the drone about seven nautical miles (roughly 13 kilometers) from the Charles de Gaulle.[24] Unidentified drones beforehand overflew a French nuclear submarine base in December 2025.[25] Such drone sightings are a part of a sample of aerial incursions into NATO airspace, presumably with the aim of reconnoitering recognized European navy bases, gear, and protection infrastructure.[26] ISW continues to evaluate that Russia is more and more participating in covert and overt assaults in opposition to Europe and that ongoing Russian and suspected Russian airspace violations are probably a part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that goals to organize for a doable NATO-Russia battle sooner or later.[27]
Russian forces probably used white phosphorus in Kostyantynivka and should have indiscriminately affected civilian areas in violation of worldwide legislation. Geolocated footage printed on February 27 reveals a Russian strike with what seems to be white phosphorus munitions in opposition to southwestern Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast.[28] A Ukrainian brigade working within the Kostyantynivka route reported that Russian forces used white phosphorus within the strike and instantly after struck the realm with a FAB-1500 guided glide bomb.[29] While ISW can not assess whether or not the impacted space contained civilians, civilians nonetheless stay in Kostyantynivka. The Ukrainian brigade reported that roughly 2,000 civilians stay in Kostyantynivka. Protocol III of the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits using incendiary weapons, equivalent to white phosphorus, in opposition to civilian targets or in areas with concentrations of civilians.[30] Russian forces notably have used white phosphorous and incendiary munitions allegedly in violation of worldwide legislation in Ukraine earlier than.[31]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces have probably begun artillery and drone preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive in opposition to Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
- Russia is reportedly increasing recruitment efforts in greater instructional establishments to employees the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).
- The Kremlin is continuous to crack down on pro-war data house figures that it can not totally co-opt or subordinate to state management as a part of wider efforts to consolidate the data house underneath the Kremlin’s management.
- Russian drone approached the French plane provider Charles de Gaulle within the Swedish port of Malmo on February 25.
- Russian forces probably used white phosphorus in Kostyantynivka and should have indiscriminately affected civilian areas in violation of worldwide legislation.
- Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical space and close to Oleksandrivka. Russian forces just lately superior close to Hulyaipole.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity although we don’t describe them in these experiences.
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian authorities issued a mass missile strike warning for the primary time within the battle. Russian authorities declared a missile strike alert in a minimum of 13 Russian federal topics on February 27, together with within the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, and Chuvashia; Perm Krai; and Rostov, Kursk, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Penza, Samara, Orenburg, and Sverdlovsk oblasts.[32] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed that particles from downed missiles hit a high-rise constructing in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[33] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed {that a} Ukrainian drone strike broken an power facility in Belovsky Raion, inflicting energy outages and killing a BARS-Kursk volunteer guarding the power.[34]
Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis
Russian goal: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast alongside the worldwide border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 27 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Sopych (northwest of Sumy City and instantly on the worldwide border).[35] ISW continues to evaluate that these small-scale cross-border assaults in beforehand dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine are a part of Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare marketing campaign to try to persuade the West that the entrance traces in Ukraine are collapsing.[36] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[37]
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, together with north of Sumy City close to Oleksiivka and Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City close to Yunakivka and Novomykolaivka, on February 26 and 27.[38]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov said on February 27 that Russian forces nonetheless management Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City) and assessed that Russian forces purpose to grab Popivka (north of Hrabovske on the worldwide border) and Pokrovka (northwest of Hrabovske on the worldwide border).[39]
Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian thirty fourth Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty ninth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[40]
Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast
Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 27 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City close to Kruhle, Vovchansk, Zelene, Hrafske, Nesterne, Okhrimivka, Lyman, Starytsya, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove and towards Izbytske on February 26 and 27.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Starytsya, Symynivka and Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (working within the Oskil and Slovyansk instructions) claimed {that a} soldier of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (forty fourth Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]; working in Kharkiv oblast) contacted the milblogger to complain that Russian ammunition restrictions are constraining Russian operations.[43] The soldier complained that the Russian navy command is limiting ammunition for artillery, tanks, and first-person view (FPV) drones such that there are occasions when Russian forces are unable to strike an advancing Ukrainian group. The soldier claimed that his unit additionally suffers a scarcity of transportable digital warfare (EW) and different counter-drone capabilities. The milblogger responded to the soldier, claiming that the Western Grouping of Forces struggles with related points.
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Velykyi Burluk route on February 27 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior close to Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk close to Chuhunivka on February 26 and 27.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River
Russian goal: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Kupyansk route on February 27 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; south of Kupyansk close to Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk close to Kurylivka and Pishchane on February 26 and 27.[46]
Russian milbloggers continued to assert that Russian forces are making false claims about their advances close to and inside Kupyansk to appease Russian political management.[47]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov said on February 26 that round 20 encircled Russian servicemembers stay in high-rise condo buildings in Kupyansk.[48]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian forty fifth Artillery Brigade (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces in Kupyanskyi Raion.[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Borova route on February 27 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Borova close to Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova close to Kruhlyakivka; southeast of Borova close to Chervonyi Stav and Novoyehorivka and south of Borova close to Oleksandrivka on February 26 and 27.[50]
Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night time of February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on February 27 that Ukrainian forces struck the Luhansk oil depot in occupied Luhansk City in a single day.[51] Geolocated footage printed on February 26 reveals a hearth within the neighborhood of the oil depot.[52] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) information signifies that there have been fires on the oil depot on February 26 and 27.[53]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
Russian goal: Capture everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Slovyansk route on February 27 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Lyman, Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman), Rai-Oleksandrivka, Kryva Luka (each east of Slovyansk), and Fedorivka Druha (southeast of Slovyansk).[54]
Russian forces attacked close to Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman close to Novoselivka, Svyatohirsk, Yarova and Sosnove; north of Lyman close to Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman close to Dronivka; east of Lyman close to Zarichne and Maslyakivka; southeast of Lyman close to Yampil; south of Lyman towards Staryi Karavan; north of Slovyansk close to Svyatohirsk; northeast of Slovyansk close to Zakitne; east of Slovyansk close to Siversk, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka and towards Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk close to Nykyforivka, Bondarne, and Fedorivka Druha on February 26 and 27.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Lipivka (southeast of Siversk).[56]
A Russian milblogger rejected geolocated footage printed on February 27 displaying a Russian flag hanging from a roof in central Drobysheve as proof for a purported Russian seizure of the settlement.[57] The milblogger said that a lot of the settlement is a contested ”grey zone” as a consequence of Russian and Ukrainian drone operations stopping both aspect from consolidating, and that Ukrainian forces are recurrently counterattacking into the settlement.
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are putting Ukrainian forces in western Stavky.[58]
Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical space.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on February 27 reveals Ukrainian servicemembers capturing a Russian servicemember close to the Kostyantynivka Train Station in central Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces probably keep management over the station.[59] Geolocated footage printed on February 27 reveals Russian forces shelling a number of residential blocks in southern Kostyantynivka which, together with footage of Russian forces putting a Ukrainian-held constructing within the space printed on February 24, signifies that there are probably no Russian positions west of the T-0504 freeway in southern Kostyantynivka.[60] Geolocated footage printed on February 25 reveals Russian forces shelling Ukrainian-held buildings in southern Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), indicating that there are probably no Russian positions within the space.[61]
Russian forces attacked close to Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka close to Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka close to Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka close to Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka close to Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka close to Stepanivka; northeast of Druzhkivka close to Pryvillya, Markove, and Minkivka; south of Druzhkivka close to Rusyn Yar and Popiv Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka close to Sofiivka and towards Novopavlivka on February 26 and 27.[62]
Order of Battle: Artillery components of the Russian seventeenth High Power Artillery Brigade (third Army Corps [AC], underneath the operational management of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are shelling Ukrainian positions in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[63] Artillery components of the first Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions northwest of Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka) in coordination with Granat-4 drone operators of the brigade‘s reconnaissance and strike battalion.[64] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are putting Ukrainian forces in northern Ivanopillya.[65] Servicemembers of the third Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (third AC, underneath operational management of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are working in central Kostyantynivka.[66] Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the thirteenth Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are putting Ukrainian positions in southern Kostyantynivka.[67] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) are putting Ukrainian positions in central Kostyantynivka.[68] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions and gear close to Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[69]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike marketing campaign in opposition to Russian navy property within the Russian close to rear on the night time of February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 27 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian gas and lubricants depots close to occupied Novotoretske (roughly six kilometers behind the frontline and southwest of Druzhkivka) and Koptieve (roughly 9 kilometers behind the frontline and simply southeast of Novotoretske) in a single day.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Dobropillya tactical space on February 27 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 27 that Russian forces superior towards Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[71]
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya close to Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya close to Dorozhnie on February 26 and 27.[72]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are putting Ukrainian autos in Kucheriv Yar.[73] Artillery components and drone operators of the a hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division (eighth CAA) are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces within the Dobropillya route.[74]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Pokrovsk route on February 27 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage printed on February 26 reveals Ukrainian forces putting a Russian servicemember west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation that didn’t change the management of terrain or the ahead fringe of battle (FEBA).[75]
Russian forces attacked close to Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk close to Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk close to Rodynske and Bilytske and towards Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk close to Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk towards Serhiivka on February 26 and 27.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Rodynske and Bilytske.[77]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that Ukrainian drone operations are hindering Russian logistics and personnel rotations within the Pokrovsk route, particularly close to Hryshyne.[78] The milblogger famous that such interdiction is stopping Russian forces from consolidating positions in Hryshyne.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly working close to Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Novopavlivka route on February 27 however didn’t make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 27 that Russian forces seized Bilyakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[80]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka close to Muravka and south of Novopavlivka close to FIliya on February 26 and 27.[81]
Ukrainian forces just lately superior within the Oleksandrivka route.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage printed on February 26 signifies that Ukrainian forces just lately superior into japanese Ternove, into northeastern Berezove, and northeast of Krasnohirske (all southeast of Oleksandrivka).[82] The footage additionally signifies that Ukrainian forces probably liberated Pryvillya and Zlahoda (each northwest of Krasnohirske) on prior dates.[83]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka close to Zlahoda, Orestopil, Oleksandrohrad, Ternove, Vyshneve, and Verbove on February 26 and 27.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Ternove and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[85]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are putting Ukrainian autos northeast of Krasnohirske.[86]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Oleksandrivka route reported on February 26 that the Russian navy command concentrated its efforts solely on the frontline throughout assaults in late 2025 to create the impression of advances by flag raisings throughout small group infiltrations to be able to generate informational results.[87] The spokesperson famous that Russian forces’ ensuing failure to ascertain strongpoints or defensive traces within the close to rear contributed to Ukrainian forces’ latest advances throughout counterattacks within the route. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade working within the route reported that the Ukrainian counterattacks on the border between Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts have additionally diminished the depth of Russian assaults in different areas of the Oleksandrivka route by forcing Russian forces to divert personnel and gear reinforcements to withstand the counterattacks.[88]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike marketing campaign in opposition to Russian navy targets in and close to occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast in a single day on February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas and lubricants depot close to occupied Mariupol (roughly 106 kilometers from the frontline).[89] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on February 27 that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air protection system on the Azovstal Steel Plant in occupied Mariupol.[90] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on February 27 {that a} Ukrainian strike began a hearth at a Russian base in Prymorskyi Raion of occupied Mariupol, wounded a minimum of 5 Russian servicemembers, and led to the lack of a minimum of 5 autos.[91]
Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis
Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions, safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes, and advance inside tube artillery vary of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces just lately superior within the Hulyaipole route.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage printed on February 27 that reveals Ukrainian forces putting a Russian servicemember working southeast of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) signifies that Russian forces probably superior south of Hulyaipole farther than ISW’s beforehand assessed ahead fringe of the battle space (FEBA).[92]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage printed on February 26 and 27 reveals Russian forces west of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) and southeast of Zaliznychne, respectively, in what ISW assesses have been infiltration missions that didn’t change the ahead fringe of the battle space (FEBA) close to Pryluky and Zaliznychne.[93]
Russian forces attacked close to Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole close to Dobropillya, Olenokostyantynivka, Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, and Varvarivka; and west of Hulyaipole close to Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne and towards Hirke on February 26 and 27.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Rizdvyanka and Ternuvate (each northwest of Hulyaipole).[95]
Ukrainian navy observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 27 that the Russian navy command is making an attempt to focus its efforts on breaking by a small space of the Hulyaipole route quite than advancing on a broad entrance.[96] Mashovets said that components of the fifth Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attempting to interrupt by towards Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Hulyaipilske (west of Hulyaipole and northeast of Orikhiv). Mashovets famous that the Ukrainian counterattacks on the northern flank of the fifth CAA threaten these Russian efforts as Ukrainian forces have superior to inside 6.7 kilometers of the Hulyaipole-Velyka Novosilka street. Mashovets said that Russian forces now look like specializing in efforts to interrupt by Ukrainian defenses to the Omelnyk-Yehorivka-Chervona Krynytsya space (all west of Hulyaipole and northeast of Orikhiv) from the Hulyaipole route to envelop Orikhiv. Mashovets famous that the Russian navy command could be unable to proceed advancing on a large entrance with out redeploying forces and gear to the Hulyaipole route however famous that Russian advances even on this extra concentrated effort are restricted. Mashovets famous that even when these Russian forces attain the japanese flank of Orikhiv, this Russian effort will probably be disjointed from the Russian advances west of Orikhiv.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Martyn Pushkar Detachment are reportedly putting Ukrainian forces close to Zaliznychne, Staroukrainka, and Svyatopetrivka.[97]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 27 however didn’t advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv towards Hulyaipilske; east of Orikhiv towards Charivne; northwest of Orikhiv close to Mahdalynivka and Lukyanivske and towards Zapasne; and west of Orikhiv close to Stepnohirsk on February 27.[98]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-8 Khabarovsk Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and thirty eighth Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty fifth CAA, EMD) putting Ukrainian autos in Novoselivka (northeast of Orikhiv).[99] Elements of the seventh Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly proceed to function within the Zaporizhia route.[100]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported floor exercise within the Kherson route on February 27.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly putting Ukrainian positions and gear close to and inside Ponyativka (northeast of Kherson City).[101]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the entrance line
Russian forces carried out a collection of drone strikes in opposition to Ukraine on the night time of February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 187 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and different drones — together with roughly 120 Shahed-type drones — from the instructions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 165 drones and that 20 drones struck 14 areas. Ukrainian state power operator Ukrenergo reported on February 27 that Russian strikes in opposition to power infrastructure triggered energy outages in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[103] Ukrainian officers reported that Russian forces broken port, power, medical, residential, instructional, and business infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts.[104]Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 27 that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense launched an digital after-action overview (AAR) system to investigate Russian airstrikes in opposition to Ukraine to extend the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defenses.[105]
Significant Activity in Belarus
Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these experiences. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CdKKPejRQ/; https://krm.gov dot ua/sogodni-vrantsi-26-lyutogo-kramatorska-gromada-zaznala-artobstrilu-ye-poraneni/; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/14JJ7ap3LDE/
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/
[3] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2027040952762696009; https://t.me/kyriienko_press/1324; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027057607341424813; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/74736
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-critical-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-in-donetsk-oblast/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025/
[8] https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cn4g0lwexydo
[9] https://echofm dot on-line/tales/studentov-verbuyut-na-vojnu-kak-minimum-v-70-uchebnyh-zavedeniyah-iz-24-regionov-vklyuchaya-anneksirovannyj-krym-vyyasnilo-eho
[10] https://meduza dot io/information/2026/02/26/v-novosibirskom-kolledzhe-ustroili-trehdnevnyy-pokaz-propagandistskogo-filma-predatelstvo-studenty-etogo-kolledzha-otkazyvalis-dobrovolno-poyti-v-armiyu
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/
[13] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/26575643
[14] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/26579827
[15] https://meduza dot io/function/2023/03/22/kak-kreml-ispolzuet-telegram-kanaly-chtoby-rasprostranyat-voennuyu-propagandu-i-feyki; https://meduza dot io/function/2026/02/27/zaderzhan-osnovatel-z-izdaniya-readovka-aleksey-kostylev ; https://t.me/astrapress/105535 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-2/
[16] https://t.me/astrapress/105535; https://t.me/astrapress/89281
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-3/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-22/
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/putins-internet-crackdown-is-rooted-in-weakness-and-a-need-to-demand-greater-war-sacrifices/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/
[21] https://www.forsvarsmakten dot se/aktuellt/nyheter/forsvarsmakten-bekraftar-observation-av-rysk-dronare/
[22] https://www.forsvarsmakten dot se/aktuellt/nyheter/forsvarsmakten-utreder-dronarincident/; https://www.forsvarsmakten dot se/aktuellt/nyheter/forsvarsmakten-bekraftar-observation-av-rysk-dronare/
[23] https://www.svt dot se/nyheter/inrikes/rysk-dronare-narmade-sig-hangarfartyget-charles-de-gaulle
[24] https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/worldwide/article/2026/02/26/swedish-military-jams-unknown-drone-near-france-s-top-aircraft-carrier_6750902_4.html#:~:textual content=%22Apercent20dronepercent20waspercent20jammedpercent20yesterday,Vernet%20toldpercent20Agence%20France%2DPresse.
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[28] WARNING: graphic footage
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027348735475216554; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/1713; https://www.instagram.com/libkos/reel/DVQJDicjPyx/; https://t.me/ombr_28/2880
[29] WARNING: graphic footage
https://x.com/28ombr/status/2027312943231099335?s=20; https://t.me/ombr_28/2880
[30] https://geneva-s3.unoda.org/static-unoda-site/pages/templates/the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons/PROTOCOL%2BIII.pdf
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-22/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_29-28/; https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-war-kherson-shelling-civilians-killed-damage/32635575.html; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65506993; https://uacrisis dot org/en/mar-fosfor; https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-17/explainer-incendiary-weapons-in-ukraine/102093560; https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1610539/Russia-Chemical-weapon-fears-Ukraine-Mariupol-phosphorus-bomb-investigation-latest
[32] https://t.me/moscowtimes_ru/42885; https://t.me/sotaproject/109720; https://t.me/bazabazon/44330 ; https://t.me/istories_media/11488; https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/volga/information/raketnaya-opasnost-obyavlena-v-bolee-chem-polovine-regionov-povolzhya; https://t.me/bbcrussian/91812; https://meduza dot io/information/2026/02/27/v-11-regionah-rossii-ob-yavili-rezhim-raketnoy-opasnosti-v-nekotoryh-vpervye-po-dannym-shot-nad-chuvashiey-sbili-dve-rakety-flamingo ;
[33] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/4896; https://t.me/tass_agency/363048 ; https://t.me/astrapress/105536 ;
[34] https://t.me/Hinshtein/17336 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/91815;
[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199526
[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2026/
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/32548
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548; https://t.me/severnnyi/6922; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/109954
[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/kilka-desyatkiv-rosiyan-sydyat-u-vysotkah-i-namagayutsya-vyzhyty-sytuacziya-u-kupyansku-bez-zmin/;
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/61561
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20144 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6922 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/28530
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/88842; https://t.me/severnnyi/6922
[43] https://t.me/gvZapad/17845
[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/32548
[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20144 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20144; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548; https://t.me/gvZapad/17844
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/88842; https://t.me/gvZapad/17844
[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/kilka-desyatkiv-rosiyan-sydyat-u-vysotkah-i-namagayutsya-vyzhyty-sytuacziya-u-kupyansku-bez-zmin/; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20141
[49] https://t.me/red_war_machine/267; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199560
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20144; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548
[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35482 ; https://t.me/army_1uas/805
[52] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2027161199096578177?s=20; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2027153294062133342?s=20; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7216
[53] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@39.322,48.514,13.826z
[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70766 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/17844
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20144 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20141; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/kilka-desyatkiv-rosiyan-sydyat-u-vysotkah-i-namagayutsya-vyzhyty-sytuacziya-u-kupyansku-bez-zmin/ ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70766 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199533 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40276
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40276
[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199533 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/2594; https://t.me/zovpobedy/17187
[58] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2027178414613078385; https://t.me/operationall_space/9899
[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027366164184051775; https://www.instagram.com/ab49ks/reel/DVQiT9jDPEL/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2022685312846033379; https://t.me/armycorps19/70
[60] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027348735475216554; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/1713; https://www.instagram.com/libkos/reel/DVQJDicjPyx/; https://t.me/ombr_28/2880; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1452; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027342437518115038
[61] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027051328699056180; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/75567
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88842 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40276
[63] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027057607341424813; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/74736
[64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027047543922647088; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15078
[65] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027314749268963420; https://t.me/huginbps/222
[66]https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027366164184051775/video/1; https://www.instagram.com/ab49ks/reel/DVQiT9jDPEL/
[67] https://t.me/rusich13sho/1452 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027342437518115038; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027314847562510525; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1455
[68] https://t.me/batAfipsa/1268 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/2595
[69] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15079
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35482
[71] https://t.me/wargonzo/32548
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548; https://t.me/rybar/77845
[73] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027325594925473806; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15080
[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/109950
[75] https://t.me/omegasof/23; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11365
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/88842; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459; https://t.me/rybar/77845 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548 ;
[77] https://t.me/rybar/77845
[78] https://t.me/rybar/77845
[79] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48983
[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/61573
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459
[82] https://t.me/mapukrdailyupdate/5822; https://t.me/c/2457716431/137 (personal supply); https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11369; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2027156506399879438; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2027066405494177831?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/18795; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11367;
[83] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2027066405494177831; https://t.me/voin_dv/18795; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11367
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548
[85] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48971
[86] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2027066405494177831?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/18795; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11367
[87] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1248044-zvilnili-400-kv-km-dnipropetrovsini-so-dopomagae-silam-oboroni-vitisnati-rf-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/27/protyvnyk-vykorystovuvav-taktyku-zahoplennya-v-kredyt-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-znyzyly-aktyvnist/
[88] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1248044-zvilnili-400-kv-km-dnipropetrovsini-so-dopomagae-silam-oboroni-vitisnati-rf-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku/
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35482
[90] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2021
[91] https://t.me/andriyshTime/52957
[92] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11371; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1108472434728493
[93] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11371; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1108472434728493 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2027102199197905220; https://www.instagram.com/411wings/reel/DVA0QSqjv8A/
[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459; https://t.me/wargonzo/32548
[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/18801
[96] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid023uaaqVocSEyp9nMu9epLvzNPb8oyvPSTiAbX3BuGEo7dnrvpAhZPdPQY88bh4fuNl; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3265
[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/18802
[98] https://t.me/wargonzo/32548 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88842 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35485 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35461 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35459
[99] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2027080739347677489; https://t.me/voin_dv/18797
[100] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40258; https:/t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40275
[101] https://t.me/dva_majors/88833; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32958
[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/56649
[103] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4707
[104] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/27712; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/27712; https://t.me/synegubov/20238; https://t.me/synegubov/20241; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3531; https://t.me/odeskaODA/14382
[105] https://suspilne dot media/1251122-fedorov-rozpoviv-pro-prioritet-persogo-misaca-roboti-u-minoboroni/
